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Abstract 
 
The Second World War influenced on the history 
of the twentieth century a lot. Based on its results, 
many conclusions were made and a huge number 
of works were written. However, even 75 years 
after the end of this bloody war, for all time of the 
existence of humanity, there are still a lot of 
questions that need to be revealed and they are 
¨waiting¨ for their researchers. 
The Second World War is a confrontation 
between economically developed countries, 
which had powerful manufacturing (industrial) 
and mining (raw materials) sectors. However, in 
some countries, some important defense 
industries were not always provided with a raw 
material base appropriate to their needs. 
One of such branches of the military industry in 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) 
in the 1920-1940s was the industry for the 
manufacture of explosives, producing for the Red 
Army trotyl (TNT) as the main type of explosive. 
The combat readiness of the Soviet army in large-
scale military conflicts directly depended on 
different types of TNT equipment and the 
purpose of the ammunition. 
The main raw material base for the production of 
TNT in the USSR was oil products, which 
required a significant increase in oil production in 
the country. For various reasons, this did not 
happen, on the contrary, oil production during the 
war was significantly reduced. This circumstance 
made it impossible to supply parts of the Red 
Army with TNT ammunition from the Soviet 
Union’s own resources. This meant a sharp 
decrease in the effectiveness of the actions of 
Soviet army during the battles with Nazi 
  Аннотация 
 
Вторая мировая война оставила 
неизгладимый след в истории ХХ века. По ее 
итогам было сделано много выводов и 
написано огромное количество работ. Однако 
даже через 75 лет после окончания этой самой 
кровавой войны за все время существования 
человечества еще осталось масса вопросов, 
требующих своего раскрытия и ждущих 
своих исследователей. 
Вторая мировая война представляет собой 
противоборство экономически развитых 
стран, имевших мощные производящий 
(промышленный) и добывающий (сырьевой) 
сектора. Тем не менее, в отдельных странах 
некоторые важные оборонные отрасли 
промышленности не всегда были обеспечены 
соответствующей их потребностям сырьевой 
базой. 
Одной из таких отраслей военной 
промышленности в СССР в 1920 – 1940-е гг. 
стала промышленность по изготовлению 
взрывчатых веществ (ВВ), выпускавшая для 
Красной Армии в качестве основного типа 
ВВ тротил. От снаряжения тротилом разного 
вида и предназначения боеприпасов 
напрямую зависела боеспособность 
советских войск в крупномасштабных 
военных конфликтах. 
Главной сырьевой базой для производства 
тротила в Советском Союзе стали 
нефтепродукты, что, в свою очередь, 
потребовало существенного увеличения 
добычи нефти в стране. В силу разных 
причин, этого не произошло; наоборот, 
добыча нефти в ходе войны существенно 
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aggressors. Only appropriate supplies to the 
USSR from the United States made it possible to 
fill the shortage of ammunition in the Red Army 
and carry out a number of successful operations 
(especially in 1944-1945), which led to the 
collapse of the Third Reich. 
In this article, for the first time, we can find the 
data on volumes of production and import of 
explosives in the USSR during the Second World 
War. The features of the development of the 
Soviet oil industry in the 1920-1940s are 
analyzed. There are the reasons for the sharp 
decline in oil production and the effect of this 
factor on the supply of Soviet troops with 
ammunition in the first half of the 1940s. 
 
Keywords: Explosives, lend-lease, oil fields, 
pyrolysis of petroleum products, toluene. 
 
 
сократилась. Данное обстоятельство сделало 
невозможным обеспечение частей Красной 
Армии боеприпасами, снаряженными 
тротилом, за счет собственных ресурсов 
Советского Союза. Это означало резкое 
понижение эффективности действий 
советских войск в ходе боев с немецко-
фашистскими агрессорами. Только 
соответствующие поставки в СССР из США 
позволили восполнить нехватку боеприпасов 
в Красной Армии и провести ей ряд 
успешных операций (особенно в 1944 – 1945 
гг.), приведших к крушению Третьего Рейха. 
В предлагаемой статье впервые вводятся в 
научный оборот из недавно рассекреченных 
архивных источников данные об объемах 
производства и импорта ВВ в СССР в годы 
Второй мировой войны; детально 
анализируются особенности развития 
советской нефтяной промышленности в 1920 
– 1940-е гг.; указываются причины резкого 
сокращения добычи нефти в первой половине 
40-х гг. и влияние этого фактора на 
снабжение советских войск боеприпасами. 
 
Ключевые слова: взрывчатые вещества, 
ленд-лиз, нефтяные месторождения, пиролиз 
нефтепродуктов, толуол. 
 
Resumen 
 
La Segunda Guerra Mundial influyó mucho en la historia del siglo XX. A partir de sus resultados, se sacaron 
muchas conclusiones y se redactó un gran número de trabajos. Sin embargo, incluso 75 años después del 
final de esa sangrienta contienda, todavía hay muchas cuestiones que necesitan ser clarificadas y están 
¨esperando¨ a sus investigadores. 
La Segunda Guerra Mundial fue una confrontación entre países económicamente desarrollados que poseían 
poderosos sectores manufactureros (industria) y mineros (materias primas). Sin embargo, en diversos países 
algunas importantes industrias de defensa no siempre recibieron una base de materia prima adecuada a sus 
necesidades. 
Una de las ramas de la industria militar de la Unión de Repúblicas Socialistas Soviéticas (URSS) en los 
años 1920-1940 fue la industria para la fabricación de explosivos, produciendo trinitrotolueno para el 
Ejército Rojo (TNT) como el principal tipo de explosivo. La preparación de combate del ejército soviético 
en conflictos militares a gran escala dependía directamente de los diferentes tipos de equipos de TNT y de 
la finalidad de las municiones. 
La principal materia prima para la producción de TNT en la URSS eran los productos petrolíferos, que 
requerían un aumento significativo de la producción de petróleo en el país. Por varias razones, esto no 
sucedió y, por el contrario, la producción de petróleo durante la guerra se redujo significativamente. Esta 
circunstancia imposibilitó el suministro de munición de TNT a partes del Ejército Rojo con recursos propios 
de la Unión Soviética. Esto provocó una fuerte disminución en la efectividad de las acciones del ejército 
soviético durante las batallas con los invasores nazis. Sólo los suministros apropiados entregados por los 
Estados Unidos a la URSS permitieron suplir la escasez de munición en el Ejército Rojo y llevar a cabo 
una serie de operaciones exitosas (especialmente en 1944-1945) que condujeron al colapso del Tercer 
Reich. 
En este artículo, por primera vez, podemos encontrar los datos sobre los volúmenes de producción e 
importación de explosivos en la URSS durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial. En el documento también se 
analizan las características del desarrollo de la industria petrolera soviética en la década de 1920-1940. 
Asimismo, se exponen las razones que explican la fuerte disminución de la producción de petróleo y el 
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efecto de ese factor en el suministro de municiones a las tropas soviéticas en la primera mitad de la década 
de 1940. 
 
Palabras clave: Explosivos, pirólisis de productos petrolíferos, trinitrotolueno, yacimientos petrolíferos. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The Second World War is the last global 
challenge and threat to democracy and security 
on the planet. This topic is always actual, and 
with each new anniversary date, interest in it only 
grows. So, in 2019, we celebrated the 75th 
anniversary of the allied Anglo-American troops 
in Normandy (Operation Overlord, June 1944), 
in 2020, we will celebrate the 75th anniversary of 
the defeat and surrender of fascist German army. 
 
In the modern world, in a difficult international 
environment, the Second World War is 
constantly politicized, primarily as the 
contribution and degree of participation of 
certain countries in the defeat of the Third Reich. 
This is really actual question right now, in 
conditions of aggravated relations between the 
Russian Federation on the one hand, and Western 
Europe and the United States of America (USA) 
on the other. 
 
During the war about 70% of Wehrmacht 
divisions participated in battles on the Eastern 
Front against the Red Army, that is, the Soviet 
Union carried the brunt of the hostilities. At the 
same time, the ability of the Soviet army to 
effectively fight the enemy was determined by 
the economic assistance of the allies in the anti-
Hitler coalition, especially from the USA, in the 
form of deliveries to the USSR of certain 
nomenclatures of military goods. One of the most 
important nomenclatures for the Soviet Union 
received from its Western allies was explosives 
and raw materials for their production. 
 
This topic, due to its specificity, has never 
become the subject of a special study. 
Meanwhile, the importance of explosives for the 
successful conduct of hostilities in the conditions 
of the Second World War is difficult to 
overestimate. In fact, only the ammunition 
(artillery shell, mine, aerial bomb, grenade) 
equipped with explosives due to the detonation 
of the latter forms a damaging effect on the 
manpower of the enemy, his equipment and 
fortifications. Therefore, the absence of 
explosives leads to the absence of ammunition, 
which makes it impossible to effectively use their 
own tanks, artillery, aircraft. All of this becomes 
useless. 
 
During the Second World War, Soviet army used 
several main types of explosives: trotyl, tetryl, 
hexogen, ten. The main one was trotyl or 
trinitrotoluene (TNT), whose specific weight in 
the total consumption of explosives by the Red 
Army for five years was about 96% (table 1) 
(Borisov & Postremova, 1947) Thus, the ability 
of the army to successfully fight the enemy 
directly depended on the state of affairs in the 
field of trotyl production for the subsequent 
equipment of ammunition. 
 
 
Table 1. The total production of the main types of explosives in the USSR (in tons) in 1940-1944 
 
Explosive 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 Total (5 years) 
Trotyl 81 552,0 111 380,0 80 247,0 97 912,9 95 032,4 466 124,3 
Tetryl 1 238,8 2 309,6 2 403,0 2 798,3 3 724,8 12 474,5 
Hexogen 128,0 204,8 1 834,0 2 669,0 2 411,8 7 247,6 
Ten - 30,5 78,0 137,4 176,9 422,8 
Total 82 918,8 113 924,9 84 562 103 517,6 101 345,9 486 269,2 
 
 
For the production of TNT in industrial volumes, 
we need an appropriate raw material base, it is 
the aromatic hydrocarbon toluene (the result of 
its processing of concentrated nitric acid is TNT). 
Accordingly, the availability of conditions for 
obtaining toluene in large volumes determined 
the ability of the URSS to effectively conduct  
 
large-scale hostilities, both defensive and 
offensive. 
 
This question has not yet been shown by 
scientists in their works. The following 
objectives require a detailed study: the study of 
the state of affairs in the field of toluene 
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production in the USSR on the eve and during the 
Second World War and the identification of the 
factors that influenced this process, ways and 
methods of solving the problem of lack of 
toluene and TNT in the conditions of hostilities. 
 
Theoretical basis 
 
The main way to obtain toluene in the USSR was 
the pyrolysis (aromatization) of petroleum 
products. Kerosene served as a raw material for 
pyrolysis. In special apparatuses named retorts it 
was heated without air access to a temperature of 
670 - 7000 С and decomposed into a number of 
products that were in a gaseous state. Aromatic 
hydrocarbons, including toluene, were among 
these products. The gas passed through a system 
of gas refrigerators and was washed with solar oil 
in order to extract aromatic hydrocarbons from 
the gas. On the whole, 25-35 kg of pyrogenetic 
(petroleum) toluene was obtained from one ton 
of kerosene (Leytman, 1947). 
 
Since the raw material for the production of 
kerosene is oil, the production of toluene by 
pyrolysis required the creation of a powerful oil 
industry in the country, but there was a problem 
of finding new oil fields. There was no answer on 
this question in 1920-1930s, Soviet geologists 
and oil workers did not have a clear opinion, at 
what depth should oil be searched? Most experts 
adhered to the theory of primary formation of oil 
fields, according to which the places of 
accumulation of oil were at the same time the 
places of its formation. Applying this theory on 
the basis of practical results already obtained, 
leading Soviet geologists believed that oil should 
be extracted from a depth of 600-1300 m, from 
deposits of the Perm and coal (carbon) systems. 
They were opposed by supporters of the theory 
of the secondary formation of oil fields, who 
believed that oil had high mobility and was able 
to migrate in the earth's crust, both in section 
(vertically) and in area (horizontally). Therefore, 
supporters of this theory argued that the Permian 
beds and carboniferous deposits do not contain 
the main oil, it serves only as a sign of the 
presence of oil reserves in other, deeper layers, in 
particular Devonian, located at a depth of 1400 - 
2000 m. However, the numerous attempts at 
exploration drilling undertaken before the war 
for the Devonian for several reasons did not lead 
to success. Meanwhile, as already shown by post-
war studies, the theory of the secondary 
formation of oil fields proved to be correct. So, 
for example, in one of the richest oil regions of 
the USSR, the Volga-Ural basin, the depth 
distribution of oil reserves was characterized as 
follows: in the interval up to 1000 there was 9 % 
of the oil, from 1000 to 1500 m there was 29 % 
of the oil, from 1500 to 2000 m there was 55 % 
of the oil, from 2000 to 3000 m there was 7 % of 
the oil (Aliev & Shashi, 1968). 
 
Methodology 
 
The theoretical and methodological basis of the 
work is the general principle of historicism and 
objectivity. In accordance with the objectives of 
the research the author also used private 
historical methods: logical, systemic, 
chronological, actualization and periodization. 
 
The article is written mainly on the basis of 
declassified materials intended for official use, 
archival documents from the Russian State 
Archive of Socio-Political History (RSASPH), as 
well as published but little-known studies and 
dissertations about the development of the USSR 
oil industry in the 1920-1950s. In addition, when 
writing the work, there are materials from some 
collections of documents devoted to the history 
of the USSR. 
 
Discussion and results 
 
During the war, the annual need for toluene in the 
USSR was about 80 000 tons, 70 000 tons of 
which of toluene were to be supplied through 
pyrolysis of kerosene (RSASPH, 664, 1, 72). 
About 14 million tons of oil was required to 
provide kerosene for the production of 70 000 
tons of toluene. Meanwhile, during the war years, 
the annual demand for kerosene of other main 
consumers (Red Army and agriculture) averaged 
about 15 million tons of oil (RSASPH, 664, 1, 
154). Thus, to fully supply the army, the defense 
industry and the national economy with only one 
kerosene (excluding other major petroleum 
products), approximately 29 million tons of oil 
was required annually. The Soviet oil industry 
was not prepared for it. There was a large 
miscalculation made in the field of development 
planning for the oil industry in the prewar period. 
 
Before the Great Patriotic War, up to 70 % of oil 
was produced in the USSR in Baku oil fields. 
However, in the second half of the 1930s among 
Soviet geologists and oil industry workers there 
was the opinion that the main oil reserves are 
located not in the south but in the east of the 
country between the Volga and the Urals in the 
area of the “second Baku”. By 1940, such large 
oil trusts as «Ishimbayneft» and «Tuimazaneft» 
(Bashkir Autonomous Soviet Socialist 
Republic), «Syzranneft» (Kuibyshev Region), 
«Buguruslanneft» (Orenburg Region), 
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«Prikamneft» (Perm Region), etc. were already 
founded and there was functioned there. 
The “second Baku” in terms of oil reserves there 
really exceeded the Baku oil fields. However, 
experts were not able to decide at what depths 
this oil should be found. 
 
In the second half of the 19th century, the Mining 
Department of the Russian Empire became 
interested in oil production in the area. So, in 
1863, on behalf of the Scientific committee of the 
Corps of mining engineers of the Mining 
Department, Professor G. D. Romanovsky made 
a geological study of the Volga region in order to 
determine their oil content. In his report he noted: 
“Permian oil sources should not be taken as 
indigenous sources of oil, but only as receivers of 
mountain oil emanating from the cracks.” 
Romanovsky believed that "the outcome of oil 
should begin in the Devonian sediments" 
(Salimov, 2005). 
 
In 1880s, geological surveys by Academician 
A.P. Pavlov were carried out in the Volga river. 
In 1887, his fundamental work “Samara Bend 
and Zhiguli” was published. It fully confirmed 
Romanovsky’s idea of the secondary nature of 
Perm oil traits and their genetic relationship with 
deeper oil horizons. Pavlov believed that oil 
penetrated Permian sediments “from the outside, 
finding a way to the surface from the depths 
along rock cracks” (Salimov, 2005). 
 
However, in the 1920s, there was another point 
of view in the USSR, the most consistent 
defender of which was the geologist K. P. 
Kalitsky. He proved the primary character of 
Permian oil features, arguing that oil in Perm 
rocks was formed from flowering plants, and did 
not migrate there from deeper Devonian 
sediments. Thus, according to Kalitsky, the 
presence of a small amount of oil in Perm 
sandstones was not evidence of the presence of 
even more significant reserves at a greater depth 
(Devonian). On the contrary, Kalitsky insisted on 
the futility of oil fields in the Volga-Ural basin in 
terms of industrial production of oil. The 
leadership of the Geological Committee under 
the USSR Academy of Sciences fully supported 
Kalitsky. So, for example, in 1926-1927 no one 
geological reconnaissance party was sent to this 
area. 
 
Supporters of the theory of the secondary 
formation of oil fields were grouped around the 
rector of the Gubkin Russian State University of 
Oil and Gas. However, the Scientific and 
Technical Directorate of the Supreme Council of 
the National Economy (STD SCNE), which was 
responsible for financing geological surveys for 
a long time supported the Geological Committee. 
This forced Gubkin to seek support even among 
the party elite of the capital, in particular the first 
secretary of the Moscow city committee of the 
AUCPB (All-Union Bolshevik Communist 
Party) N. A. Uglanova. So, at one of the plenary 
sessions (meetings) of the Central Committee of 
the party (CC AUCPB) Uglanov described the 
situation: «A number of comrade communists, 
prominent scientists, including comrade Gubkin 
… actually from the collegium of scientific and 
technical management SCNE kicked out … The 
State Oil Research Institute is virtually wiped out 
and has no influence on the developing capital 
construction in our oil industry … The Petroleum 
Research Institute is given some kind of 
miserable 300 000, and all millions are given to 
the Geological Committee. And who is sitting on 
this Geological Committee? All bisons. And 
research institutions, where new scientific 
personnel, new forces begin to take shape, these 
institutions are shaking, do not give an extra 
penny. It can be proved. The Moscow Committee 
has these materials at the disposal» (Transcript of 
the joint plenum of the Central Committee and 
Central Control Commission of the AUCPB 
April, 1928, 2000). 
 
The first oil field of the «second Baku» was 
discovered only in April 1929 in the Verkhne-
Chusovsky towns of the Perm Region at a depth 
of 330 m. It happened by accident. So, when 
contouring a potash deposit from a well from a 
depth of about 300 meters, drilling fluid with oil 
and gas bubbles began to flow, and then an oil 
fountain with a flow rate of up to 20 tons per day 
hit (Baibakov, 1984). 
 
In October 1930, 51 drilling rigs were operating 
in the area. However, according to the theory of 
the primary formation of oil fields, all of them 
were drilled to a shallow depth and therefore the 
expected discoveries of large oil fields did not 
follow. Therefore, already in 1931, some 
geologists began to actively advocate curtailing 
exploration work in this region and directing all 
efforts and resources to the southern regions. 
 
The situation was saved by a well № 702, drilled 
near the village of Ishimbay on the right bank of 
the Belaya River to a depth of 680 m (Permian 
deposits): on May 16, 1932, it produced a 
powerful oil fountain. Following it, other wells 
began to operate. So, the Ishimbaev oil field was 
discovered, it was one of the largest one in 
Bashkiria. It was Bashkiria that became the main 
oil-producing region of the Volga-Ural basin 
before the Second World War. So, if in Bashkiria 
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in 1932 only 4 500 tons of oil were produced, 
then in 1937 it was produced 962 000 tons, and 
in 1939 it was produced 1 670 000 tons 
(Baibakov, 1984). 
 
Thus, by the middle of 1930s, the Volga-Ural 
basin was rightfully considered an area suitable 
for industrial oil production. However, it was not 
possible to use its huge potential because of the 
fact that well drilling, according to the erroneous 
theory of the primary formation of oil fields, 
continued at shallow depths in Perm sandstones 
and carbon deposits. Supporters of Gubkin were 
not allowed to drill deeper. So, Gubkin’s ideas in 
the Tuymazaneft trust (Bashkiria) were shared by 
I.V. Barrels. He proposed in 1938 to drill a 
Devon well with a design depth of 1 700 meters. 
However, upon reaching a depth of 1 500 meters, 
the leadership of the trust decided to stop drilling 
(Salimov, 2005). 
 
With the outbreak of war, the country's 
leadership, desiring to sharply increase oil 
production, decided to develop the area of 
"second Baku". If during the pre-war five-year 
periods the development of the oil industry of the 
Volga-Ural basin accounted for 5-10 % of all 
investments in the oil industry of the USSR, then 
in 1942 the amount of capital expenditures for 
expanding the Volga-Ural basin amounted to 
41.6 %, and in 1943 it amounted to 55.8 % of the 
all-Union investments in the oil industry 
(Budkov & Budkova, 1985). Nevertheless, this 
did not lead to positive results. According to the 
theory of primary occurrence of oil, the wells 
were drilled to a depth of not more than 1200 m 
for the exploitation of deposits of coal and Perm 
systems (Aliev & Shashin, 1968). As a result, 
only small industrial oil reserves with low well 
production rates (7-10 tons per day) were found 
there. As a result, in Bashkiria the largest oil 
producing region of the Ural-Volga region oil 
production in 1943 compared to 1940 was 
reduced by 2 times. In 1941-1943 only 5.7 
million tons of oil was produced in the «second 
Baku», which amounted to only 7.8 % of the all-
Union production, 73 million tons (Budkov & 
Budkova, 1985). This state of affairs led to the 
fact that many Soviet geologists began to doubt 
the prospects of the Volga-Ural basin. However, 
attempts by supporters of the theory of I.M. 
Gubkin to start drilling there on the Devon were 
still met with hostility by the leadership of the oil 
industry. 
 
Devonian deposits were drilled in the Ural-Volga 
region due to the sluggishness of the suppliers. 
On December 1943, the team of the drilling 
master V. A. Rakov drilled a well № 41 in the 
area of the Apple Ravine (Kuibyshev region) to 
the design depth, laid in November of the same 
year as an operational coal-bearing Suite of the 
coal system. For start-up of wells in operation it 
is required of the casing. However, they have not 
had time to put before navigation on the Volga, 
the only way of delivery is stopped. It was 
necessary to wait for the beginning of summer 
navigation. During these few months, the 
condition of the wellbore, not strengthened by 
casing pipes, could significantly deteriorate, 
which would lead to the loss of the well itself. To 
prevent this situation, it was decided to transfer 
the well into the category of exploration and drill 
on Devon, deepening the trunk for another 500-
700 m (Muradov, 1995). The decision was 
correct. On June 8, 1944 the well № 41 from a 
depth of 1478 m gave a fountain of oil with a 
flow rate of 485 tons per day (Takoev, 1995). 
This proved the industrial oil-bearing capacity of 
the Devonian deposits in the area between the 
Volga and the Urals and it was the beginning of 
large-scale drilling on Devon. As a result, if in 
1943 the "second Baku" produced 1.95 million 
tons of oil (Budkov & Budkova, 1985), then in 
1950 it produced 38 million tons (Baibakov, 
1984). 
 
Thus, due to the erroneous determination by 
Soviet geologists of the depths of the main oil 
reserves in the Ural-Volga region and their 
rejection of the hypothesis of academician I. M. 
Gubkin, the real opportunities available in the 
USSR for a sharp increase in oil production on 
the eve of the war were not realized during it. For 
the explosives industry, this meant limiting the 
raw material base of toluene, which had a 
negative impact on the supply of ammunition to 
the army (Grechko, 1947). 
 
Another disadvantage of the oil industry, which 
affected the decline in oil production in 1941-
1943, was the extensive nature of its 
development. This circumstance was explained 
both by the peculiarities of the oil production 
process and by the mismanagement of many 
managers of oil fields and trusts. It was 
preferable to drill new wells than the rational use 
of old ones. As a result, the funds allocated by the 
state for the overhaul of working wells and the 
equipment involved in them, were not mastered, 
and the wells were prematurely liquidated 
(Budkov & Budkova, 1985). This was typical for 
the main supplier of oil to the USSR in the pre-
war years, for Baku oil region. Accordingly, not 
only the increase, but even the maintenance of oil 
production at the same level, was achieved there 
by putting into operation new wells. So, in 1941, 
new wells accounted about 16.1 % of all oil 
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produced (3.76 million tons). This allowed to 
exceed the 1940 level by only 6 % (1.3 million 
tons) (production increased from 22.2 to 23.5 
million tons). Thus, if it was not for the 
commissioning of new wells, in 1941 oil in Baku 
would have been produced by 11.08 % (2.46 
million tons) less than in 1940. 
 
The significance of this factor was not considered 
at the beginning of the war, when the country's 
leadership, with the aim of boosting oil 
production in the Volga-Ural basin, decided to 
transfer some of the oil engineering enterprises 
there from Azerbaijan. In summer and in autumn 
it 1941 by the decision of Government Short-
Term Commitments in the Urals-Volga region 
there was the evacuation of the Baku factories 
"Krasniy proletariy", "1 May," named in the 
honor of A. F. Myasnikov, F. E. Dzerzhinsky and 
I. V. Stalin, as well as the experimental office of 
turbine drilling (EOTD) and the trust 
"Aznefterazvedka" with all personnel, drilling 
equipment and tools. This weakened the oil 
industry of Azerbaijan. However, the factories 
remaining in its composition soon also ceased to 
serve the oil industry workers, switching to the 
production of military products. As a result, the 
production of equipment for the needs of the 
Baku oil fields in 1941 was significantly reduced, 
and in 1942 it almost completely stopped. The 
commissioning of new wells ceased, and oil 
production began to plummet. 
 
The cessation of the production of oil equipment 
prevented not only the drilling of new wells, but 
also interfered with the ongoing and overhaul of 
old wells. The technical equipment of repair 
crews deteriorated; their number began to 
decline. For example, if in 1941 one repair team 
serviced an average of 17 wells, then in 1942 it 
had to service 42 ones (Madatov, 1975). 
Repairmen could not cope with the consequences 
of accidents common in the practice of oil 
production: breaks in pump rods and pipes, 
breakdowns of pumping units and group drives, 
damage to towers, ruptures of fountain valves, 
etc. As a result, downtime of existing wells has 
become more frequent. 
 
The lack of repair equipment began to have a 
particularly severe effect at the end of 1942, 
which was associated with the withdrawal of 
Nazi army in the summer and autumn of that year 
to the Volga and the northern spurs of the 
Caucasus Range. The main railways and 
waterways, through which oil and oil products 
were transported from Baku, were cut. 
Interruptions in the operation of transport that 
could not cope with the export of finished 
petroleum products very quickly led to an 
overflow of available oil capacities and oil 
storage facilities. As a result, a number of wells 
had to be mothballed. A long shutdown of the 
wells led to their watering and the formation of 
plugs, which made it difficult to put them into 
operation and required serious repair work. The 
latter, in the absence of the necessary equipment, 
was impossible. 
 
The main consequence of the weakening of the 
material and technical base of the Baku oil fields 
was a sharp drop in oil production there: from 
23.5 million tons in 1941 to 11.8 million tons in 
1944. Since the oil industry of the Volga-Ural 
basin could not cope with its tasks, Baku was still 
the main oil producing region in the USSR. As a 
result, oil production in the USSR also decreased 
a lot. If in 1941 the Soviet Union produced 33 
million tons of oil, then in 1944 it produced only 
18.3 million tons. This catastrophically did not 
correspond to the pre-war plans. So, in March, 
1939, during the work of the 18th AUCPB 
congress, its participants worked out a resolution 
that provided for an increase in oil production up 
to 54 million tons already in 1942 (Decision of 
the party and government on economic issues, 
1967). 
 
In conditions of falling oil production, the annual 
consumption of about 14 million tons of oil in 
order to obtain pyrogenetic toluene became 
impossible. The main plants for the pyrolysis of 
oil products were located in the center of the 
country and therefore were not captured by the 
Nazis: oil and gas plant № 1 in Moscow, oil and 
gas plant № 2 in Gorky, factory in the honor of 
Budyonny in Baku and plant № 96 in the Gorky 
region. Their total capacity was 3 450 tons of 
toluene per month or 41 400 tons per year. 
However, due to the lack of kerosene, the 
enterprises worked at half-strength. Even in a 
fairly prosperous 1945, for the first five months 
these plants produced 6 275 tons of toluene, 
which amounted to 36.37 % of all the capacities 
they had (Leytman, 1947). 
 
Conclusions 
 
Thus, during the years of the Great Patriotic War, 
the production of the most important explosive 
for the Red Army, trotyl, was not provided in the 
required volumes with the necessary toluene for 
its manufacture. This forced the Soviet 
leadership to seek economic assistance from the 
USA, which, like the USSR, was interested in 
defeating fascist Germany. Already on 
November 7, 1941, American president 
Roosevelt extended the Lend-Lease Act to the 
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USSR, according to which all military goods 
delivered by the USA government to its allies 
and expended by them during the hostilities were 
free of charge. 
 
The fuel base of the United States and the 
production of aromatic hydrocarbons, were 
incomparably more powerful than the fuel base 
of the USSR. So, for example, in 1942, oil 
production in the USA and the USSR amounted 
to 200 and 22 million tons, respectively (History 
of Second World War, 1947). Therefore, in the 
framework of Lend-Lease, the Americans 
provided invaluable assistance to the Soviet 
Union in the supply of both toluene (TNT was 
made from it at Soviet defense enterprises) and 
finished TNT (Table 2) (Leytman, 1947). 
 
 
Table 2. The receipt of imported toluene and TNT in the USSR in 1941 – 1945 
 
Year Toluene received (in tons) TNT received (in tons) 
1941 1400 --- 
1942 12500 8577 
1943 27400 19030 
1944 24100 60919 
1945 10000 28930 
Total during the war: 75400 117456 
 
 
In 1941-1944, Soviet troops received 403 350 
tons of explosives, of which 384 572 tons or 95.3 
% were TNT. There were 88 526 tons or 23 % of 
imported TNT. In addition, during the indicated 
period, the USA delivered 65 400 tons of toluene 
to the USSR. This amount of toluene was enough 
for the manufacture of 125 769 tons of TNT, 
which gives another 32.7 % (consumption 
coefficient of toluene is 0.52, that is, 
approximately 1.9 tons of TNT are obtained from 
a ton of toluene). Thus, during the years of 
Second World War, the Red Army's firepower 
was more than half ensured thanks to the supply 
of toluene and TNT from the USA to the USSR 
(55.7 % of the TNT received by Soviet army had 
the foreign origin) (Leytman, 1947). Without 
these supplies, successful combat operations of 
the Red Army against Nazi German forces would 
have become impossible, which would lead to a 
delay in hostilities and a sharp increase in 
casualties. During the Second World War, the 
USSR lost about 26.6 million people. However, 
these losses would have been even higher if it had 
not been for USA assistance to the Soviet Union 
in the supply of explosives. 
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